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his paper shows that neighborhood factors 
matter in schooling investments: in the face of 
the availability of a new technology that altered 
schooling returns, agents learned of the benefits of new 
returns to schooling from neighbors and adjusted 
schooling investments over time. Using household data 
available from the onset of the Green Revolution in 
India—where in some regions the diffusion of high-
yielding varieties (HYVs) affected returns to school-
ing—the author shows that the schooling distribution 
of the parents’ generation in a neighborhood is 
important to social learning and household decisions 
regarding child schooling investments. The study 
attempts to empirically identify the process of social 
learning and neighborhood effects on child schooling 
investments in a Bayesian learning model. 
Background 
The question of whether agents know of and how fast 
they respond to return structures poses a fundamental 
question about how to think about economic develop-
ment: are observed variations of human-capital accum-
ulation simply a consequence of different return-
augmenting mechanisms in perfect information? Or are 
they a consequence of local environments that affect 
agents’ learning speed under imperfect information? 
Though the implications of the answers for develop-
ment policy differ, the questions are 
not easy to answer through casual 
observations. 
The data for this study consist of 
farm household panel data from India: 
the Additional Rural Incomes Survey 
(ARIS) conducted by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Re-
search (NCAER) in three crop years, 
1968–69, 1969–70, and 1970–71. 
These years correspond with the onset of the Green 
Revolution, when at least in some districts, farmers 
experienced changes in schooling returns. 
Empirical Framework and Strategy 
The author constructs a theoretical framework to pro-
vide the basis for the empirical analysis. Hypothesizing 
that agents learn about schooling returns from income 
difference between educated and uneducated house-
holds (schooling return signals), he shows that agents’ 
learning speed is influenced by neighborhood condi-
tions such as income uncertainty and schooling distri-
bution of the parents’ generation. 
The empirical strategy focuses on specification and 
identification issues. There are two possible ap-
proaches. The first would be to trace the agents’ learn-
ing and sequential decisionmaking, approximating sig-
nals for agents as residuals from profit function—
which includes information on unknown returns to 
schooling. However, by construction, the residual-
based return signals may contain unobserved factors 
that are potentially correlated with education, biasing 
the returns upward. Or if parents’ education is posi-
tively correlated with child schooling, it would be easy 
to infer a positive correlation between the residual-
based return signal and child schooling. 
Therefore, the author chooses to directly estimate 
schooling returns that agents learn about with which to 
identify schooling decisions. The basic strategy 
involves two stages. First is to identify farm profit 
function, including the effect of education. It is 
possible to check whether schooling returns had 
changed when HYV became available in some 
villages. The author estimates (1) village-specific 
schooling returns separately for each village, and 
(2)  the impact of HYV adop-
tion on schooling returns, from 
which to construct village-
specific schooling returns. 
In the second stage, the 
author estimates the learning-
investment rules with the esti-
mates of schooling return sig-
nals constructed from the first 
stage, incorporating theoretical 
predictions on neighborhood effects. 
Empirical and Simulation Results 
The empirical results indicate first that schooling 
investment is positively correlated with the income 
difference between educated and uneducated 
households. This finding is consistent with social 
learning. Second, schooling distribution  of the parents’ 
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generation in a village influences the response of 
school enrollment to schooling return signals—that is, 
agents’ learning speed—in a manner consistent with 
theoretical predictions on social learning. Local school-
ing distribution of the parents’ generation has inter-
generational externalities to schooling investments in 
children. 
Simulations show that school enrollment rate would 
increase by about 3 percentage points in five years if 
the proportion of educated households in a village in-
creased from 0 to 0.53. Since educated households 
have, on average, a higher income than uneducated 
households, a disparity of average household income 
would emerge over the five years. Thus, the initial dis-
tribution of schooling, which differs across communi-
ties, determines the evolution of income inequality 
over space. 
The analysis also has some aggregate implications: 
reallocating agents across communities can improve 
the aggregate response of schooling investments to a 
change in returns. This economy-wide implication is 
also quantified based on the estimated parameters. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
These results clarify the importance of schooling distri-
bution of the parents’ generation within a community. 
Heterogeneity of schooling increases informativeness 
of the community when it encounters a change in 
schooling returns, since agents easily compare differ-
entially educated agents. The homogeneous community 
with few differences in schooling makes it hard to 
identify the effects of schooling. 
To increase learning efficiency in a society, should 
the educated and uneducated be integrated or segre-
gated by communities? These findings imply that inte-
gration of the two populations in a community is more 
desirable. Intuitively, given that a mixture of the two 
groups in a neighborhood enables the comparison 
between the groups, all communities should be 
heterogeneous. This implication is against a common 
finding on positive sorting in residential choice 
behavior. If agents are sorted by their types, including 
education, in the choice of their residential areas, the 
population becomes more homogeneous in a 
community and weakens the response of schooling 
investments to a change in schooling returns. If social 
learning effects are not internalized in agents’ location 
choice, the evidence of this paper justifies a socially 
desirable policy intervention. This implication should 
not be exclusive to education but could equally apply 
to issues such as social class and the division of labor. 
However, the relevance of the findings in this paper 
depends on the frequency of structural changes: if the 
benefit of education generates from situations of dis-
equilibrium such as the Green Revolution, the aug-
mented returns to schooling will eventually decrease as 
the knowledge of new technologies diffuses evenly and 
widely in the population. 
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